1035-91-1128 Karl-Dieter Crisman* (karl.crisman@gordon.edu), 255 Grapevine Road, Wenham, MA 01984. Points-based rules respecting a pairwise-change-symmetric ordering. Preliminary report. A typical ordering of lists of candidates (for comparing lists relative to a voter's preferred list) is lexicographic; if $A B C D$ is the voter's list, then for that voter $A D C B>B A C D$. Yet $B A C D$ is obtained via only one pairwise change (versus three for $A D C B$ ), so perhaps this is not the only natural (partial) order. This perspective arises naturally in Dodgson's rule, as well as in the geometric view of possible lists as chambers in a hyperplane arrangement complement, such as in Terao's recent proof of Arrow's Theorem. In this talk, we begin examining some point-allocating social welfare functions which observe the natural symmetry of this order. Among other interesting behavior is a violation of Intensity of Binary Independence in an unusual way. (Received September 18, 2007)

